Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and
Labor Arbitration
Bernard D. Meltzer

I propose to say something about three persistent and interdependent
questions: First, is the arbitration system especially vulnerable to
pressures that are incompatible with a fair and even-handed disputesettling mechanism? Second, what is the appropriate role of the courts
in actions challenging an award as wholly incompatible with the governing agreement? Third, what is the proper role of the arbitrator with
respect to statutory or policy issues that are enmeshed with issues concerning the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement?
The first two issues have been highlighted by the sharply conflicting
assessments of arbitration by Mr. Justice Douglas and Judge Hays.
There are several ironic aspects to their disagreement. Mr. Justice
Douglas, evidencing an unusual devotion to the passive virtues, said in
effect: "Anything We Can Do, Arbitrators Can Do Better." Judge Hays,
although an eminent ex-arbitrator, implied: "They Got Plenty 0' Nuttin'" and "Let's Call the Whole Thing Off." Incidentally, my own
view' about each of those performances is: "It Ain't Necessarily So."
Before venturing some comments about the principal counts in
Judge Hays' indictment, let me summarize my views about his methodology. His charges generally suffer from a painful lack of documentation, and when he reaches for evidence, his methods are distorted by a
passion for denunciation. In short, he has substituted for the Supreme
Court's mythology of arbitral excellence a new mythology of arbitral
corruption and incompetence.
Any judgment about the competence of arbitrators is complicated
by two factors. First, arbitration is obviously not a unitary system. It
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reflects all the diversities that apply to any single professional group
and compounds those diversities by drawing its personnel from a smorgasbord of occupations, all of which may, or may not, constitute a profession. Second, a good deal of arbitration is invisible because only a
small proportion of awards are published and because an award is, of
course, only a fragment of the total proceeding. For these reasons, I will
not engage in the act of faith or despair that any blanket indictment or
eulogy involves. But, in accordance with a suggestion by Professor Edgar
Jones that arbitrators should keep their humility in order, I want to
quote a short passage from Bernard Dunau's critical review of Hays'
lectures. "It is unfortunately true," Dunau said, "that the level of judging, whether judicial, administrative or arbitral, is in the overall quite
mediocre, but for those who have worked in all three forums, the arbitrator does not suffer by comparison." 2 In any case, the parties can
much more easily escape from mediocrity in arbitration than in other
forums, although their freedom to do so is, of course, limited by the
need for joint acceptability.
It is that need which is the basis for the principal count in Hays'
indictment. "A proportion of arbitration awards," he tells us, " .. are
decided not on the basis of the evidence or of the contract or other
proper considerations" but in a way designed to preserve the arbitrator's
employability. 3 And he goes on to suggest that, regardless of the proportion of such awards, which is unknown, a system of adjudication in
which the judge's income depends on pleasing those who engage him
is per se a thoroughly undesirable system, wholly incompatible with the
independence a judicial officer should have. 4 This charge plainly goes
to the heart of the system and is wholly independent of varying estimates of arbitral competence, although it may have some relationship
to occasional excrescences of the system, such as the rigged award.
There is, in my opinion, some basis for the fear that economic selfinterest and the desire to be loved, which are linked with future acceptability, will distort adjudication. Such a risk must be acknowledged
unless all arbitrators are angels-a position that even Mr. Justice
Douglas or, indeed, arbitrators themselves are unlikely to accept. But
Judge Hays ignores two important considerations. First, all systems of
adjudication involve a similar risk. Second, important safeguards against
self-regarding adjudication are built into the arbitration system. The
neglect of those safeguards has, in my opinion, led Judge Hays greatly
to overrate the distortion that actually results from the need for acceptability.
2 Dunau, Book Review, 1966 THE AmEmCAN ScHOLAR 774-76.
3 HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW 112 (1966).
4 Ibid.
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Those safeguards are well-known and have been effectively presented
in Saul Wallen's review 5 of Hays' book. Nevertheless, they bear restatement because of their fundamental importance to the integrity of the
arbitration system. The losing party is generally the principal threat
to the arbitrator's future acceptability. To be sure, even winners
grumble about an arbitrator's handling of the hearing or the quality
of his opinion, but such complaints are healthy because they suggest
that acceptability turns on the overall quality of the arbitrator's performance and not merely on his decision. In any event, the principal
question for an arbitrator, assuming for the moment that he is ruled
by a greedy desire for more customers, is how to reduce the risk implicit
in the fact that one party generally will lose. I can think of no better
answer to that question than conscientious workmanship, for such
workmanship appears to be the best protection against the veto that
labor and management will each be able to exercise in the future. The
need for future acceptability would thus appear to bring the arbitrator's
self-interest and disinterested adjudication into harmony rather than
conflict. Consequently, even if one accepted a devil's view of arbitrators
as a group ruled by love of money, it would not follow that the pressure
for future acceptability would corrupt the decisional process. On the
contrary, the "invisible hand," so dear to some of my economist friends,
appears in the context of arbitration to link the private ends of arbitrators with the public interest in justice. That kind of harmony between
private and public purposes is important for the suitability of any adjudicative arrangement and becomes of critical importance as the number of arbitrators devoting substantially full time to arbitration increases.
The devil's theory of arbitration rests, moreover, on some dubious
presuppositions about arbitrators as a class. It presupposes that they
lack a sense of integrity, of craftsmanship, and of self-respect, and that
they are essentially a craven group of money-grubbers, abjectly fearful
of displeasing their customers and willing to default on their responsibilities to avoid such displeasure. I find no basis in Hays' book or in
my experience for so denigrating a view. Indeed, the arbitrators whom
I know impress me as conscientious men, who are willing to call them
as they see them. Differing judgments about the character of a large and
shifting class may result, of course, from different slices of experience
and different standards of judgment, and I do not claim an adequate
basis for reliable generalizations about a heterogeneous and largely
invisible group.
Judge Hays' view of the parties is no more flattering than his view of
5 Arbitrators and Judges-Dispelling the Hays, Haze, S.W. LEGAL FOUNDATION 12TH
INSTrrrTE ON LABOR LAw 159 (1966).
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arbitrators. He sees the parties with their weapons of economic reprisal
ready for use against the arbitrator who rules against them. That view
ignores that the parties are sometimes shaken and occasionally even
persuaded by a well-reasoned opinion and that the parties also understand that honest and reasonable men may disagree. There are, moreover, bits and pieces of evidence that call into question the judge's
dismal forebodings. There are, to my knowledge, refreshing instances
where the loser has praised the arbitrator's opinion and has called on
him for more work. There are also denials by lawyers appearing in
arbitrations that they respond to defeat with indignation or blacklisting. Finally, it is striking that lawyers for unions and management are
respected arbitrators. Their reputation for integrity and competence
has overcome suspicions of partisanship generated by their associations
or their view of the world. It is, of course, possible that one canny
forum-shopper will rely on the partisan connections of an arbitrator to
influence him to lean over backwards, while the other side will
rely on his doing what comes naturally. But, if my thoroughly unscientific poll of lawyers is reliable, it is not such gamesmanship that
is at work, but rather the parties' confidence that men of integrity and
competence can, as adjudicators, transcend their personal loyalties and
discipline their personal values. It is the existence of such a tradition
in arbitration, as in law or medicine, that is, in my view, the decisive
condition for an acceptable system, and I am confident that that condition is usually satisfied.
Furthermore, Judge Hays, as I have already suggested, fails to consider the extent to which similar pressures operate on official tribunals.
I do not mean to justify distortion, partisanship, or sloppiness in arbitration by pointing to their existence elsewhere. But the Judge was
engaged in comparing alternative tribunals in a real world. Accordingly,
the methods of staffing official tribunals, such as the labor court proposed
by Hays, deserve attention. This is not the place for an extended discussion of the factors that enter into the selection of administrative and
judicial personnel. It is enough to say that the politics of patronage
often entrust adjudication to mediocrities, who may seek to remain acceptable to those who have conferred past favors and who may determine future preferment. Indeed, as has been suggested from time
to time," the fear of partisan and mediocre official tribunals has contributed to the growth of labor arbitration. The existence of such
fears underscores the limitations in an appraisal of arbitration that,
like Judge Hays', exaggerates the vices of arbitrators, then assumes that
6 See, e.g., Aaron, On First Looking into the Lincoln Mills Decision, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS, 12TH ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS 12 (1959).
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alternative machinery would conform to an ideal model, and finally
concludes that arbitration should be supplanted by new tribunals
or that there should be a fundamental alteration in the relationship
between arbitration and the judicial system.
Even if Judge Hays' dismal appraisal had the analytical and empirical
support that it conspicuously lacks, some might suggest that the parties
shape and pay for their dispute-settling mechanism and that their choice
of a fool or a rogue for an umpire is private rather than public business.
That suggestion would, in my view, be manifestly erroneous because it
would brush aside important public dimensions of this private system.
Arbitration is an adjunct of a bargaining system that has been shaped
by the compulsion of law. Furthermore, both the courts and national
and state legislatures have endorsed arbitration; indeed, the courts had
placed their coercive power behind arbitration awards long before Lincoln Mills7 and the Steelworkers Trilogy8 made arbitration the darling

of national labor policy.
The public interest is also involved because arbitration constitutes
an alternative and an obstacle to the use of official machinery. Thus,
prior resort to arbitration, and indeed its pendency or availability, may
move the NLRB to withhold its jurisdiction and may also influence
the substance of the Board's action where it takes jurisdiction. 9 Similarly, under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a moving party may be denied
injunctive relief against serious acts of violence on the ground that he
has rejected arbitration.' 0 Finally, it has been heldU-erroneously I believe, although I will not argue the point-that arbitral determinations
are, in some circumstances, binding in connection with related causes
of action maintained in the courts. Plainly, such displacement of official
machinery by arbitration would be intolerable if arbitration, as Judge
Hays charged, were per se a thoroughly undesirable method of adjudication.
The final dimension of the public interest in arbitration is the most
important and the most obvious one. Arbitration is designed primarily
as an instrument of justice for the industrial community, and the state
could not properly rely on an inadequate market mechanism to disTextile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 853 U.S. 448 (1957).
8 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 863 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 863 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 863 U.S. 598 (1960).
9 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists (J.A. Jones Construction Co.), 185 N.L.R.D.
1402, 49 L.R.R.M. 1684 (1962).
10 Trainmen v. Toledo P. & W.R.R., 821 U.S. 50 (1948). But cf. Local 721 v. Needham
Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964).
11 Los Angeles Paper B3ag Co. v. Printing Specialties Union, 845 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1965).
7
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charge one of its fundamental responsibilities. Furthermore, the quality
of arbitral performance will not only affect equity and efficiency in the
plant but will also have consequences that radiate far beyond the plant.
To workers, the line between official and private adjudication is likely
to be an unimportant one; and the integrity, actual and apparent, with
which arbitrators discharge their function will influence the respect of
employees, among others, for the rule of law generally. That consideration, however imponderable, takes on a special importance when the
idea of law is being challenged by recourse to force in many sensitive
areas of our national life.
The achievement of the private and public purposes linked to arbitration depends on a suitable coordination of the judicial and the arbitral functions, and it is one aspect of that problem which I now want
to explore. The Supreme Court, seeking such coordination in the Steelworkers Trilogy,12 emphasized that in general the "merits" were for
arbitrators rather than the courts. Those cases, and Enterprise Wheel 13
in particular, were, however, not crystal clear as to whether the severe
limitations imposed on courts when the issue was whether a dispute
should be arbitrated were to be equally applicable when the issue was
whether an award should be enforced.
In Enterprise Wheel, the Court declared:
An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. .

.

. He may, of

course, look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to his obligation, courts have no choice but
to refuse enforcement of the award. 14
That passage is susceptible to conflicting interpretations as to the
scope of post-arbitral review. Under one interpretation, the arbitrator's
award or his remedy is not to be disturbed, provided that he says that
his award rests on the agreement. It is only when his "words," as distinguished from his result, manifest an infidelity to the agreement that
judicial enforcement of his award is to be denied. In other words, unless the arbitrator confesses that he has strayed beyond the agreement,
12 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 563 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
18 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
14 363 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).
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his award is to be treated as drawing its essence from the agreement. 15
That interpretation would serve to exclude courts from the merits and
would, accordingly, be faithful to the basic thrust of the Trilogy.
Nevertheless, that interpretation is not without its difficulties. It
would provide for a somewhat sterile regulation of the arbitrator's
rhetoric but not his action. It would, accordingly, not reach situations
where his action, speaking louder than his words, plainly appeared not
to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, that interpretation might result in discouraging arbitrators from
writing opinions, which the Court said were a good idea.
In his lectures, Judge Hays rejected judicial review limited to the
rhetoric of the award, and as to post-award review supported a distinction made by the Second Circuit between an arbitrator's "jurisdiction"
to be wrong and his "authority" to decide issues contrary to the contract. 16 Perhaps others will find that distinction clearer than I do. My
puzzlement results from my assumptions that the arbitrator is wrong
only when he decides issues contrary to the contract and that, accordingly, if he has jurisdiction to be wrong, he has jurisdiction to decide
things in a way that a court would consider contrary to the contract.
Perhaps, the distinction is between an arbitrator's jurisdiction to be
"wrong" and his jurisdiction to be "preposterously wrong."
Despite my doubts about the meaning of the Second Circuit's distinction, I am certain that that distinction foreshadows another confrontation between courts and arbitrators as to who is to be master of the
merits in actions to enforce or vacate the award. Consider, for example,
the familiar clause barring the arbitrator from adding to or subtracting
from or altering the provisions of the agreement. In almost every case,
the disappointed party will be able to point to that clause as a restriction on the arbitrator's award-granting authority. Furthermore, a judicial determination as to whether the arbitrator observed that restriction
would almost always involve a scrutiny of the merits. Finally, even
where such a restriction has not been expressly incorporated into the
agreement, one could be fairly implied, on the basis, indeed, of the
Court's statement in Enterprise Wheel limiting the arbitrator to the
interpretation and administration of the agreement.
The difficulties I have just mentioned were sharpened by Torrington
Co. v. Metal Products Workers,17 recently decided by a divided Second
Circuit. That case involved a twenty-year policy that granted employees
15

See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability, and Collective Bargaining, 28 U.

CH. L. RE:v. 464, 484-85 (1960).
16 Hays, supra note 3, at 80-82
17 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
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paid time-off for voting. That policy had been unilaterally established
by the company, had never been incorporated in an agreement, and had
been formally and publicly renounced by the company about ten
months before the expiration of a prior agreement. In negotiations for
the renewal of the agreement that governed the grievance, the company
had stated that it would not re-establish the former policy, whereas the
union had called for its re-establishment. The agreement, executed
after a long strike in the course of which non-strikers had not been given
paid time-off for voting, was silent about that matter. A grievance led
to an award that the company remained bound by the established practice until it was changed by mutual agreement. The trial court's decision vacating that award was affirmed by the Second Circuit on the
following grounds: (1) The arbitrator had ignored the company's revocation of its past policy; that revocation had been excluded from arbitration by the narrow arbitration clause incorporated in the prior
agreement and had, accordingly, been a matter for the company's discretion.' (2) The arbitrator, who had been barred by the governing
agreement from adding to its terms, had ignored the fact that "labor
contracts generally state affirmatively what conditions the parties agree
to, more specifically, what restraints the parties will place on management's freedom of action"'19 and had, consequently, erred in placing on
the union's consent to the abanthe company the burden of securing
20
policy.
pre-existing
the
of
donment
Judge Hays did not sit in Torrington, but his ideas were there. His
colleagues' opinion quoted this statement from his lectures: "No great
harm is done by applying a liberal rule as to arbitrability if the court
2
carefully scrutinizes what the arbitrator later decides." ' The court
18

See note 20 infra for a comparison of the two arbitration clauses.

19 362 F.2d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 1966).
20 The prior agreement had provided: "The arbitrator is bound by and must comply
with all the terms of this agreement, and he shall not have any power whatsoever to
arbitrate away any part of the agreement, nor add to, delete from, or modify, in any way,
any of the provisions of this agreement. The company's decisions will stand and will not,
be overruled by an arbitratorunless the arbitrator can find that the company misinterpreted or violated the express terms of this agreement." Id. at 681 n.7 (emphasis added).
The later agreement, under which the disputed award had been rendered, retained the
first sentence quoted above, except for formal changes, omitted the sentence italicized
above, and added provisions denying arbitral power over merit increases or wage
determinations. Id. at 678 n.2.
The court summarily dismissed the possibility that the change in the arbitration provisions, which had been one of the causes of a 16-week strike, implied a rejection of the
"reserved rights" theory. Id. at 681 n.7. The court, however, surprisingly failed to mention
that the later agreement contained an integration clause-a point that had been emphasized in the company's brief. See 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1220, 1224 n.29 (1966).
21 362 F.2d at 679-80 n.4.
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then delineated the respective roles of the arbitrator and the reviewing
court as follows: First, an arbitrator must stay within the confines of
the agreement. Second, a reviewing court has a correlative responsibility to enforce that limitation; e.g., to pass on whether the agreement
authorizes the arbitrator to expand its express terms on the basis of past
practice. Third, the court should not accept the arbitrator's decision
where the court can clearly perceive that the arbitrator has derived his
authority from sources outside the agreement. The court recognized
that its approach might be objected to as an impermissible judicial intrusion on the merits.

22

But the court, relying on the passage from En-

terprise Wheel quoted above, dismissed that objection.
The dissenter in Torrington, who also invoked the language of Enterprise, found that objection decisive and forcefully urged that the
majority, by examining the merits of the award, had disregarded the
mandate of the Trilogy.2 3 He urged also that the majority had in effect
revived the Cutler-Hammer 4 doctrine for post-award proceedings by
substituting a new catch-phrase-"the arbitrator's authority"-for "the
'2 5
arbitrator's jurisdiction.
The dissent is, in my view, more faithful to the central thesis of the
Trilogy. Nevertheless, I would renew an earlier suggestion-that the
courts in actions involving the validity of the award should have more
responsibility for the merits than in actions to compel arbitration. 26
Unlike the Second Circuit's and Judge Hays' view, that suggestion
does not rely on what is, I believe, an unworkable and spurious dichotomy between "jurisdiction" and "authority," but on the following
considerations: At the enforcement stage, the court would have the
benefit of the arbitrator's expertise in the same way as a court reviewing
the decisions of an administrative agency has the benefit of administrative expertise. The suggested approach would, moreover, permit the
arbitration process to realize its potential for therapy and would, at the
same time, recognize that the award, although therapy for one party,
may be poison to the agreement, whose purpose, after all, is to provide
a code for both parties rather than a couch for one of them. Beyond
those considerations are more important ones that go to the responsible
exercise of judicial power. It is, I believe, questionable to require courts
to rubber-stamp the awards of private decision-makers when the courts
22 Id. at 680-81 n.6.
23 Id. at 682-83.
24 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 297 N.Y. 519, 74 NXE.2d
464 (1947).
25 See 362 F.2d at 684.
26 See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 485.
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are convinced that there is no rational basis in the agreements for
the awards they are asked to enforce. In no other area of adjudication are the courts asked to exercise their powers while they are
denied any responsibility for scrutinizing the results they are to enforce. The courts, moreover, exercise such responsibility in areas at
least as complex and specialized as labor arbitration, whose mysteries
have, I believe, been sometimes exaggerated. In any case, the unique
attempt to shrivel judicial responsibility in enforcing arbitration
awards is likely to fail because it runs against the grain of judicial tradition. It is thus not surprising that other circuits have adopted an ap27
proach similar to that of the Second Circuit.
The exercise of some judicial responsibility for the results to be enforced seems to me not only inevitable but desirable from the standpoint
of arbitration. I do not, of course, mean to suggest the desirability of
frequent recalcitrance by the losing party and frequent appeals to the
courts. Arbitration is already sufficiently expensive and slow. But the
prospect of responsible, albeit limited, judicial review, even though
rarely resorted to, is likely to deepen the arbitrator's sensitivity to the
admonition in Enterprise Wheel about the sources of his authority.
The existence of a judicial check on arbitral aberrations is, moreover,
likely to make the parties, and especially employers, more willing to
agree to arbitration clauses, without demands for exclusion clauses that
multiply issues in negotiations. Finally, such review would presumably
promote clearer and better reasoned opinions by arbitrators. In short,
I am suggesting that limited judicial review in this context would have
28
its customary institutional values.

There are serious risks, as well as substantial values, involved in
even such drastically limited judicial review. The overriding risk is,
of course, unenlightened, heavy-handed, and excessive intervention.
But that risk is much smaller than it was a generation ago, because of
the work of the National Academy of Arbitrators, because of the emphasis the Supreme Court has given to the values of arbitral autonomy,
and because the parties generally realize that such values are jeopardized
by excessive reliance on the courts. Indeed, in the Midwest long before
27 See, e.g., H. K. Porter v. United Saw File Prod. Workers, 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir.
1964), involving pro rata pensions for employees who had not fulfilled service requirements
and who were terminated as a result of substantial relocation of facilities, discussed in
Hays, supra note 3, at 100-02. For a discussion of bases for granting pro rata pensions in
such circumstances, see BERNsTEIN, FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, ch. 4 (1964).
See also Truck Drivers Union v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 1964);
cf. Textile Workers v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
28 Cf. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 79 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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the Trilogy the parties rarely challenged an award. Thus, when the
enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act was being considered in
Illinois, knowledgeable persons could not point to a single instance of
recalcitrance. I will resist the temptation to speculate about why there
has been considerably greater resort to the courts in the East.
The risks of judicial review might, moreover, be moderated by a
limiting formula, even though a tradition of judicial self-limitation
is more important than limiting verbalisms. Nevertheless, such a
tradition might be developed or strengthened by analogizing to the
limitation on judicial review of a master's findings in the federal courts.
Such findings are to be respected unless manifestly erroneous and thus
are entitled to even more deference than those of administrative
agencies. In the context of arbitration, such a formula would mean that
the award would be enforced unless it clearly lacked a rational basis
in the agreement read in the light of the common law of the plant
where appropriate.
In this connection, the report of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor
concerning the 1966 amendments to the judicial review provisions of
the Railway Labor Act is instructive. That report, after referring to the
rejection of a proposal that "arbitrariness" or "capriciousness" be
grounds for setting aside an award, stated: "This was done on the
assumption that a Federal Court would have the power to decline to
enforce an award which was actually and undisputedly without foundation in reason or in fact, and the committee intends that, under this
bill, the courts will have that power." 29 The proposal I have advanced
for arbitration subject to Section 301 is in substance similar to the
assumption behind the RLA amendment-an amendment that sought
to subject the two arbitration systems to the same kind of judicial
review.
There is another less important risk involved in even limited judicial
review: it might compel arbitrators to write opinions in all cases
with a view to insulating their awards against judicial reversals.
Indeed, Professor Wellington, who has also suggested that courts
should exercise more responsibility when their enforcement powers
are invoked, has intimated that arbitrators might or should be required to write opinions.30 Although I concede that a well-reasoned
opinion is generally desirable, I doubt that courts would or should
impose an inflexible requirement as to opinion-writing. In most cases,
the award itself will clearly draw its essence from the agreement. Even
29 See S. REP. No. 1201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
so See Wellington, JudicialReview of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.L.
483 (1962).
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in the cases where that relationship is not self-evident, an opinion, although especially useful, need not be required since the brief of the
party that prevails in arbitration can present the basis for the award.
Perhaps, however, a requirement, like that imposed on trial courts, to
set forth findings of fact would be desirable. Such a requirement would
merely recognize the obligation that every conscientious arbitrator im31
poses on himself.
I realize that a proposal for a recognition of increased judicial
responsibility in the post-award proceedings will strike many as a
heretical retrogression that involves substantial threat to the arbitration
process. I concede that danger, and that there is plenty of room for
reasonable disagreement about the desirability of increased judicial
review, the possibility of limiting it, and indeed whether the formula
I am suggesting would increase judicial review or would, as I believe,
only bring it out into the open. In any event, let me make it clear that
my position does not rest on the ideology of despair but rather on the
conviction that arbitration, like other systems of adjudication, should
not be able to conscript judicial power while denying judicial responsibility; that the courts would exercise their limited responsibility judiciously; and that such limited judicial supervision would strengthen
the institution of arbitration.
Arbitral fidelity to the agreement is also involved in the last question
I shall discuss: the arbitrator's responsibility when an award warranted
by the agreement would be repugnant to an applicable federal or state
policy or rule of public policy.
The following situations suggested by recent cases illustrate the
general questions involved: First, a grievant who volunteered to attend
a training course paid for by the employer claims overtime for travel
to and from school. Under the governing contract read in the light of
past practice, it is clear that the grievant's claim would be denied, but
the arbitrator reads the Fair Labor Standards Act as requiring payment
for travel time.32 Second, a layoff is plainly consistent with the agreement but is attacked as involving discrimination repugnant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.33 A similar issue may be raised when there
31 A transcript of the proceedings would not be a prerequisite for judicial review of
an award. Of. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20, 24, 30-31 (1956).
32 Pennsylvania Electric Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 526 (1966) (E. Stein, Arbitrator).
S3Eaton Mfg. Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 1045-50 (1966) (Kates, Arbitrator) (arbitration clause
restricting arbitration to grievances "involving interpretation of the contract" does not
confer jurisdiction over grievance that employer, although observing the provisions of
the agreement concerning bumping and recall of females from layoff violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); cf. UAW v. Chace, 262 F. Supp. 114, 64 L.R.R.M. 2098 (E.D.
Mich. 1966); Southern Airways, Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 1135, 1140 (1966).
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is no contractual basis for requiring an employer to supply information
that would be required by the NLRB as an incident of the duty to
bargain in good faith.3 4 Since that issue is to get major attention later
on in these proceedings, I will do no more than mention it here.
In the first two situations I have described, what effect, if any, should
the arbitrator give to the law, which, we will assume, would be contravened by an award based on the agreement?
Before exploring that question, it is appropriate to distinguish it
from other questions that have a surface similarity but are fundamentally different. One such question is how the just-cause standard
should be applied and the applicable burden of persuasion defined
where a grievant's employment, as in the case of an airline pilot, involves substantial risks to the public and to fellow-employees and where
regulation imposes duties on employers that reflect the risks involved.
In such situations, there is no necessary incompatibility between the
contractual standard and that drawn from regulation or public policy; 35
for the contractual standard is formulated loosely, presumably for the
purpose of permitting consideration of all relevant factors, including,
of course, the relevant regulation or public policy. Similarly, where a
contractual provision is susceptible to two interpretations, one compatible with and the other repugnant to an applicable statute, the
statute is a relevant factor for interpretation. Arbitral interpretation of
agreements, like judicial interpretation of statutes, should seek to avoid
a construction that would be invalid under a higher law. In both of the
situations just mentioned, the arts of construction and the actual or
imputed intention of the parties make it possible to avoid a direct
conflict between the agreement and the law.
Where, however, there is an irrepressible conflict, the arbitrator, in
my opinion, should respect the agreement and ignore the law. My position is based on several interrelated considerations. The first one is the
mandate implicit in the following statement from Enterprise Wheel:
"It [the award] may be read as based solely upon the arbitrator's view
of the requirements of enacted legislation, which would mean that he
exceeded the scope of his submission." 36 The basis for that approach is,
For a questionable assertion of sweeping powers by an arbitrator, see Hotel Employers
Ass'n of San Francisco, 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966), where the arbitrator not only found
that an agreement between employers and a civil rights group conflicted with a prior
collective bargaining agreement but also purported to invalidate the civil rights agreement on the ground that it contravened state and national prohibitions of racial discrimination, even though the civil rights group was not a party to the arbitration.
34 See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 423, 426 (1958).
35 Cf. Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations in Labor Arbitration Cases, 14 RUTGErs
L. REv. 217, 222 (1960).
36 363 U.S. at 597.
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of course, that the parties typically call on an arbitrator to construe and
not to destroy their agreement.37 There is, moreover, no reason to
credit arbitrators with any competence, let alone any special expertise,
with respect to the law, as distinguished from the agreement. A good
many arbitrators lack any legal training at all, 38 and even lawyer-

arbitrators do not necessarily hold themselves out as knowledgeable
about the broad range of statutory and administrative materials that
may be relevant in labor arbitrations. Indeed, my impression-and it
is only that-is that non-lawyer arbitrators are more willing to rush in
where lawyers fear to tread. Here again an analogy to administrative
tribunals is instructive. Such agencies consider themselves bound by
the statutes entrusted to their administration and leave to the courts
challenges to the constitutional validity of those statutes. Arbitrators
should in general accord a similar respect to the agreement that is the
source of their authority and should leave to the courts or other official
tribunals the determination of whether the agreement contravenes a
higher law. Otherwise, arbitrators would be deciding issues that go
beyond not only the submission agreement but also arbitral competence. Arbitrators would, moreover, be doing so within a procedural
framework different from that applicable to official tribunals. Finally,
they would be impinging on an area in which courts or other official
tribunals are granted plenary authority. 39 Under such circumstances,
37 The parties may, of course, submit to an arbitrator either the issue of whether a
given agreement is compatible with a pertinent statute or "problems" that result from
the need to accommodate an agreement and the law. But such submissions, which may
call for the reshaping of the agreement, are infrequent. In any event, there is not, in my
opinion, any persuasive basis for giving any special deference to arbitral determinations
as to the reach of the law. If, however, the parties have agreed to submit to the arbitrator
issues as to the impact of regulation on the agreement and if his award is consistent with
both the submission agreement and the law, there is no reason for the courts to withhold enforcement of the award.
38 It is true that NLRB members are not necessarily lawyers. But those who rely on
that point to support an argument for broad arbitral jurisdiction over legal issues often
ignore important differences between arbitrators and Board members: (1) The latter have
a staff of legal advisors. (2) Board hearings are conducted by trial examiners who, under
recent Civil Service requirements, must be duly licensed lawyers. U.S. Civil Service
Comm., Announcement No. 318, Hearing Examiners 5 (1965). (3) Board members deal
continuously with a single statute whereas arbitrators, if required to deal with the law
governing collective agreements, would from time to time be confronted with a considerably broader range of national and unpreempted state regulation.
39 Although the Board's deference to arbitration is to be discussed by others, I wish in
passing to express my strong doubts about its approach in the celebrated case of International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), aft'd, Ramsey v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964); cf. Ford Motor
Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462, 48 L.R.R.M. 1280 (1961). For a thoughtful critidsm of International Harvester, see Summers, Labor Arbitration: A Private Process with a Public
Function, 34 Rav. JUR. U.P.R. 477, 492-94 (1965).
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the limited judicial review appropriate for arbitral interpretations of
the agreement would be wholly inappropriate for arbitral interpretation of the law.
The position that I have outlined may be challenged on the following grounds, among others: It is wasteful and misleading for an arbitrator to render an award that is clearly repugnant to a controlling
statute. Furthermore, insofar as such an award commands illegal
conduct, it makes the arbitrator a party to illegality, requires a judicial
proceeding to set things straight, 40 and generally demeans the arbitration process by inviting non-compliance with, and reversal of, awards.
Although those considerations reflect a praiseworthy desire to have
arbitrators solve the whole problem in a fashion compatible with the
pertinent regulatory framework, they are, in my opinion, not persuasive. Any deception of the parties can be avoided by the arbitrator's
noting that he is not passing on the validity of any contractual provision that appears to be questionable or invalid under the law. Similarly,
if an award based solely on the agreement would call for illegal action,
the arbitrator can make clear that his mandate is contingent on the
legality of the contractual provision involved. In this connection, it
should be observed that such provisional enforcement of illegal or
unconstitutional provisions is a familiar and inescapable incident of
the existence of multiple tribunals with different spheres of responsibility.41 Finally, a distinction between clear and not so clear statutory
violations-which, incidentally, is Cutler-Hammerwith a reverse twist
-is likely to produce substantial administrative difficulties as well
as bad law.
The overtime case I referred to previously is instructive on the last
40 It appears preferable to postpone judicial scrutiny of an arguably illegal contractual
provision until an award has been rendered, thereby providing the opportunity for a
construction of an ambiguous provision that would make it compatible with the law.
it is true that such postponement might involve delays and industrial unrest, triggered
by non-compliance with an arbitration award. But delay is an inescapable cost of any
primary jurisdiction approach, and industrial unrest might be reduced by a clear
statement by arbitrator and the parties concerning the existence of an unresolved issue

of law.
Where an award is attacked in a judicial proceeding as contrary to the NLRA, judicial
competence to deal with such questions may be challenged. For suggestions that such
challenges should be rejected, see Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations II, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 291-92 (1959); Sovern, Section 301
and the Primary Jurisdictionof the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529, 551, 564 (1963).
41 For example, an administrative agency may issue an order that it deems unconstitutional, leaving the constitutional issues to the courts. Similarly, it has been suggested that
in actions covered by Section 301 of the LMRA, courts should enforce an agreement that
is completely illegal in that, at the time of its execution, the union lacked majority

support. See Meltzer, supra note 40, at 292-95, and Sovern, supra note 40, at 542-43.
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point. The arbitrator there relied on an Interpretative Bulletin issued
under the FLSA and treated the interpretation as conclusive.42 He made
no reference to a well-known Supreme Court case which expressly denied conclusive effect to such interpretation. 43 It is not clear from his
award that the status of the interpretation bulletin was argued. In any
event, that issue surely deserved more consideration than it appears
to have been given.
Some persons may be ready to tax me with an inconsistency in that
I am prepared to import something like the Cutler-Hammer test into
judicial review of awards while rejecting a similar test as a basis for
arbitral invalidation of a contractual provision clearly repugnant to an
applicable statute. But the apparent inconsistency is not a real one
because of the fundamental difference between the arbitral and judicial
roles. An arbitrator is in general the proctor of the agreement and not
of the statutes; thus, in the absence of arbitration he has no responsibility for the statutory scheme. Furthermore, he does not directly
exercise the coercive power of the state. A court, by contrast, exercises
such power and in doing so is concerned not only with the agreement
but also with the law that limits and governs it. To grant courts limited
responsibility for measuring the award against the agreement while
denying arbitrators a similar responsibility for measuring the agreement against the law is, in each case, to confer responsibility that
reflects the different functions being performed and the different presuppositions about the competence of the respective tribunals.
My discussion has, I know, not discharged my assignment, which
called for an assessment of arbitration. As I have suggested, the heterogeneity and substantial invisibility of arbitration are serious obstacles
to assessments that have a more substantial basis than the ideologies of
hope or of despair. In addition, reliable assessments presuppose systematic study of the impact of the arbitration process on concrete
relationships, on communications between managers and managed, on
training, on morale in all echelons, on equity and efficiency, and on
bargaining. To attempt to isolate arbitration from all other variables
relevant to those matters is, I know, a tall order. Furthermore, in
suggesting more research I have, unwisely perhaps, overcome my usual
allergy to such suggestions that are not accompanied by detailed blueprints. I have done so because the National Academy of Arbitrators has
made a useful beginning in stimulating such inquiries. They should,
of course, be supplemented by additional and rigorously designed
42

See Pennsylvania Electric Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 526, 527-28 (1966).

43 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944); Idaho Metal Works v. Wirtz,

383 U.S. 190, 194, 207-08 (1966); 1 DAvis,

ADMINISTRATMVE

LAW TREATISE, §§ 5.03-5.05 (1958).
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studies of how arbitrators are selected and by detached and systematic
analysis of awards and the total adjudicative process. Since arbitrators
may be reluctant to criticize each other and since the most qualified
critics tend to be arbitrators, it would be desirable to stimulate such
study by those courts of last resort for other forms of adjudication,
namely, the law reviews. Perhaps the Academy might consider it desirable to stimulate such interest by offering prizes for excellent student work.
I do not mean to oversell the possible contribution of the studies
I have mentioned to the resolution of the underlying controversies that
surround arbitration. Similar studies of other adjudicative processes,
such as my colleagues' study of the jury system, 44 suggest that more data
may narrow the issues but will not resolve the ideological conflicts that
envelop all modes of adjudication. In the end, then, judgments about
arbitration will rest on faith as well as reason. My own faith in the
usefulness of arbitration and the integrity of arbitrators as a class has
not been shaken by recent exercises in demonology. And the work of
the Academy and the concern that it has reflected for the integrity and
competence of arbitration will surely make it easier to keep the faith
and, what is more important, will contribute to works appropriate to
that faith.
44

See KAvwN & Zsm, TnE AmCMAN JURY (1966).

